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Notes
ASSURING THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY AFTER
FIREFIGHTERSLOCAL 1784 v. STOTTS
The conflict between affirmative actionprogramsandseniority rights in the workplace has intensifiedin recentyears. This conflict arose in Firefighters Local 1784 v.
Stotts, in which a district court issued a temporary injunction against the layoffs of
black workers,pursuantto an affirmative action consent decree. The Supreme Court,
in striking down the injunction, established an apparentpredominance of seniority
agreements over affirmative action consent decrees. This Note criticizes the Supreme
Court's approachtaken in Stotts, by examining the history of affirmative action, case
development, and the basicpolicyjustfications underlyingworkplace integration. An
alternative to the all or nothing approach taken in Stotts is advanced, in which
neither the seniority rights of the majority nor the rights of minority workers are
impinged.

INTRODUCTION

AFFIRMATIVE ACTION programs and seniority rights in the
workplace are well accepted concepts in their respective areas of
the law. Discrimination in employment has been expressly prohibited by federal law for twenty years.' Yet, minorities are still subjected to discrimination in the operation of the laws, the avarices of
private industry, and the subtle prejudices of a white dominated society. Affirmative action programs are at the center of prospective
efforts to integrate the workplace.2
1. It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer- (1). . . to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions
or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race ... (2) to limit,
segregate or classify his employees in any way which would deprive. . . any individual of employment opportunities. . . because of such individual's race .
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982).
2. The term "affirmative action" is used in this Note to describe a temporary, raceconscious remedy that requires an employer either to achieve a racially representative
workforce within a specified time or, failing that, to fill a certain percentage of vacancies in
hiring or promotion until minority workers are fairly represented in the employer's
workforce. Fair representation can, but does not necessarily mean, the percentage of minority workers available from the surrounding area. Under no circumstances will an employer
be required to hire or promote any person who is unqualified for the position. Voluntary
affirmative action programs are those which are developed by legislation, executive order or
private initiative as opposed to those which are created by a decree of a court or by an Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) conciliation agreement. Public affirmative
action means any such program adopted by a governmental body.
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Seniority rights in the workplace have long been hailed as a primary foundation of modem American unionism 3 and as a basic
right incident to employment. 4 In an era of continuing high unemployment, seniority rights have tended to become one of the most
valued aspects of continuing employment.' When seniority expectations come into direct conflict with the laws, those expectations
must generally bow to the legislative prohibitions.6 When seniority
rights confront affirmative action obligations, however, the conflict
can result in a heavily litigated battle, with an unpredictable
conclusion.
This Note examines the seniority-equal opportunity confrontation in the context of the Supreme Court decision in Firefighters
Local 1784 v. Stotts.7 Although the Court's decision that seniority
rights take precedence over affirmative action obligations is perhaps
defensible, the language, tone and style of the opinion may evoke far
reaching and fundamental changes to affirmative action programs.
The Justice Department deems that it must now review past equal
employment opportunity negotiations to make them conform to its
interpretation of Stotts.8 This Note will first discuss the history of
3. Note, The Sixth Circuit Holds That Judicially Imposed Racial Quotas Take Precedence Over a Seniority System, 11 FLA. ST. L. REV. 677 (1984).
4. Seniority is used to calculate eligibility for benefits and as a factor in deciding status
for transfers and promotions. See, Aaron, Reflections on the Legal Nature andEnforceability
of Seniority Rights, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1532, 1534 (1962). Aaron postulates that seniority is
purely a product of organized labor, specifically collective bargaining, and could not survive
the termination of the agreement that created it. Seniority rights, after all, have none of the
appurtenances of property rights; they cannot be bought, sold or assigned. Id. at 1534-40.
The term "seniority rights," as used in this Note, is merely a term of convenience and not a
term of art.
5. Seniority is frequently the determinant for layoffs in collective bargaining agreements. See generally Cooper & Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under Fair Employment Laws:
A General Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1598
(1969).
6. E.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 347-48 (1977)
(proven post-Civil Rights Act discrimination in a seniority system may be remedied by any
appropriate Title VII relief).
7. 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984).
8. Assistant Attorney General William Bradford Reynolds has initiated a review of
affirmative action programs negotiated by the Justice Department pursuant to a promise he
made immediately following the Supreme Court's decision in Stotts. Upon completion of the
review, the Justice Department has asked federal courts in selected cases to revise consent
decrees to comply with the holding of Stotts. Neely, Government Role in Rooting Out, Remedying Discriminationis Shifting, 16 NAT'L J. 1772 (1984). See also, Tufani, U.S. Takes New
Tack Against Use of Quotas, Washington Post, March 1, 1985, at A3, col. 3; Washington
Post, April 30, 1985, at A8, col. 1. The reaction to this move has been negative. See, eg.,
Washington Post, May 25, 1985, at A2, col. I (BNA survey reveals vast majority of state and
local government employers are resisting Justice Department proposals); N.Y. Times, June
19, 1985, at A22, col. 1 (indicating that Justice Department switch undermines existing court
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affirmative action programs and their conflicts with seniority
rights, 9 followed by an in depth description of the Stotts case. 10
Part III includes analysis and criticism of the Supreme Court's
opinion in Stotts," with the final section emphasizing the importance of integration in the workplace. 12
I.

EQUAL

EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY AND BONA FIDE

SENIORITY SYSTEMS

A.

Significant Cases and Legislation Priorto Stotts

Affirmative action programs have become a widely accepted employment practice in the United States. An affirmative action program can be described as a temporary, race-conscious remedy in
which an employer takes positive steps to make its workforce racially representative. 3 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act provides
for affirmative action remedies to correct intentional discrimination. 14 Additionally, such programs have been authorized by Executives,' 5 enacted by various legislatures, 16 including Congress,' 7 and
implemented by private industry.' 8 These programs have generally
been upheld as constitutional by the courts.' 9
orders); 43 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 881 (May 11, 1985) (House Judiciary Committee voted
for new restrictions on Justice Department's review of affirmative action consent decrees).
9. See infra notes 13-79 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 80-121 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 122-212 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 213-67 and accompanying text.
13. Supra note 2.
14. "If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in ... an unlawful
employment practice charged in the complaint, the court may . . . order such affirmative
action as may be appropriate. . . or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate." Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, § 706(g), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982).
15. See, eg., Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1965) (President Johnson's ordering
of affirmative action in federal employment); Exec. Order No. 11,478, 34 Fed. Reg. 12,985
(1969) (President Nixon's mandate that the Civil Service Commission assume full responsibility for assuring equal employment opportunity within the federal government); Exec. Order
No. 12,050, 43 Fed. Reg. 14,431 (1978) (President Carter's establishment of the National
Advisory Committee for Women and his order that federal agencies cooperate with the Committee); Exec. Order No. 12,336, 46 Fed. Reg. 62,239 (1981) (President Reagan's establishment of the Task Force on Legal Equity for Women).
16. See, eg., Local Union No. 35, etc. v. City of Hartford, 625 F.2d 416, 418 (2d Cir.
1980) (local ordinance requiring city contractors to employ 15% minorities held constitutional).
17. See, eg., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 454 (1980) (congressional order that
10% of funds for federal government contracts be expended for minority business enterprises
held constitutional).
18. See, eg., United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 197-98 (1979) (Kaiser Aluminum's plan to reserve half of training program openings for blacks held constitutional).
19. See supra notes 16-18.
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Despite their widespread use, affirmative action programs have
come under increasing attack." Some have even commented that
the very notion of race-conscious action is abhorrent to the Constitution.2 1 The primary judicial challenge has come in the form of
reverse discrimination suits, in which whites assert that a race conscious remedy has denied them equal protection of the laws. The
most important reverse discrimination case, Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, aa was brought not under Title VII, but

under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act,

3

which prohibits discrimi-

nation in federally assisted programs. A fractured Court24 upheld
an injunction that struck down an affirmative action program which
specifically reserved a set number of positions for minority students.2" Yet, the Court found that carefully restricted, race-conscious remedies for discrimination were constitutional.2 6 The Court
20. See Assault on Affirmative Action, TIME, Feb. 25, 1985, at 19-20; Cutbacks on Quotas, TIME, March 11, 1985, at 33; Will, Battling the RacialSpoils System, NEWSWEEK, June
10, 1985, at 96; Murray, Affirmative Racism, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 31, 1984, at 18.
21. See, e.g., A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT (1975) ("the history of the racial
quota is a history of subjugation, not beneficence"); Dershowitz & Hanft, Affirmative Action
and the HarvardCollege Diversity-Discretion Model: Paradigm or Pretend?, 1 CARDOZO L.
REV. 379 (1979) (race-specific affirmative action programs are mere cover for other, more
controversial goals); Tribe, Perspectives on Bakke: Equal Protection, ProceduralFairness, or
StructuralJustice?,92 HARV. L. REV. 868 (1979) (Powell's swing vote reflected deep national
aversion to explicit racial quotas); Calabresi, Bakke As Pseudo-Tragedy, 28 CATH. U.L. REV.
427 (1978-79) (Redress for discrimination suffered by the individual and not per se by the
racial group conforms with a meritocracy. Bakke's upholding of racial considerations merely
papers over the problem.); Voros, Three Views of Equal Protection: A Backdrop to Bakke,
1979 B.Y.U. L. REV. 25 (the Court cannot selectively uphold Constitutional and statutory
prohibitions against discrimination by race); Griswold, The Bakke Problem-Allocation of
Scarce Resources in Education and Other Areas, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 55 ("quotas are inherently invidious, even when their purpose is benign"); DeRonde & DeRonde, The Post-Baike
Decisions-Walking the Equal Protection Gangplank, 10 W. ST. L. REV. 143 (1983) (criticizing the Supreme Court for legitimizing quota analysis).
22. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
23. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d to 2000d-4 (1982).
24. Justices Powell, Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens each filed a separate opinion. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 265.
25. Id. Justice Powell, with Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Rehnquist and
Stevens, concurring in the judgment, found that the specially reserved positions for minorities
were invalid as a denial of equal protection. Id. at 270-71. The finding was based on the fact
that the program was implemented by the university's Board of Regents, a group legally
incapable of indentifying and remedying discrimination. Id. at 307-10. Certain purposes of
the admissions program that were offered as justifications, such as improving health care
services in minority neighborhoods and attaining a diverse student body, did not have the
necessary connection to the program to justify its impact upon Bakke. Id. at 310-15.
26. Id. at 315-19. Justice Powell, with Justices Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun concurring in the judgment, found that the California Supreme Court decision to enjoin
the school from ever considering an applicant's race was improper. Id. at 272, 320. Justice
Powell found such consideration acceptable as long as the entire admission process did not
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held two years later that Congressionally authorized affirmative action for minority contractors was not improper. 27
Moreover, in United Steelworkers v. Weber,2 8 the Court held
that Title VII does not prohibit all private, voluntary affirmative
action programs.2 9 Justice Brennan set forth the standards for such
a program, 30 but cautioned that he was not defining a "line of demarcation between permissible and impermissible affirmative action
plans.131 The Weber standards have, nevertheless, been applied to
affirmative action programs in a wide array of circumstances. 32
These rules have often been interpreted by the lower federal courts
as permitting the preferential treatment of minorities to stand in the
face of reverse discrimination claims.33
hinge upon the applicant's race. Id at 320. Justice Brennan reasoned that Title VI "does not
bar the preferential treatment of racial minorities as a means of remedying past societal discrimination to the extent that such action is consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment."
Id at 328.
27. Fulilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 492 (1980) (minority set asides for federal
contracts are permissible because Congress may find and remedy past discrimination).
28. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
29. Id at 206. "The natural inference is that Congress chose not to forbid all voluntary,
race-conscious affirmative action." Id
30. Id. at 208. For a voluntary, private-sector affirmative action program to be legitimate, its purposes must mirror those of Title VII. It must not unnecessarily trammel the
interests of white employees, and it must be a temporary measure to eliminate a manifest
racial imbalance. Id. See Kreiling & Mercurio, Beyond Weber: The Broadening Scope of
Judicial Approval of Affirmative Action, 88 DICK. L. REv. 46, 56 (1983) (suggesting that
Brennan utilized five standards). But see Meltzer, The Weber Case: The Judicial Abrogation
of the Antidiscrimination Standard in Employment, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 423 (1980) (sug-

gesting that it is improper to comply with Title VII by violating it with affirmative action).
31. Weber, 443 U.S. at 208.
32. See, eg., Detroit Police Officers' Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671, 689-91 (6th Cir.
1979) (Weber standards applied to uphold program to assure the hiring and promotion of
black police officers); Price v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 26 Cal. 3d 257, 275-76, 161 Cal. Rptr. 475,
486-87, 604 P.2d 1365, 1376-77 (1980) (Weber standards applied to voluntary race-conscious
affirmative action program to assure hiring of minority attorneys in district attorney's office);
Chmill v. City of Pittsburgh, 488 Pa. 470, 485, 412 A.2d 860, 868 (1980) (race-conscious
hiring plans for municipal employees constitutional under Weber); Maehren v. City of Seattle,
92 Wash. 2d 480, 504, 599 P.2d 1255, 1268-69 (1979) (selective certification of minority
firefighters does not unnecessarily trammel the interests of white employees by Weber
standards).
33. See, eg., Williams v. New Orleans, 694 F.2d 987, 992-99 (5th Cir. 1982) (merely
demonstating that other measures may eventually end discrimination insufficient to overturn
use of affirmative action plan); Talbert v. City of Richmond, 648 F.2d 925, 931-32 (4th Cir.
1981) (plaintiff failed to prove that city acted with discriminatory intent in promoting minority officer before him); Valentine v. Smith, 654 F.2d 503, 511 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1124 (1981) (plan for faculty assignments upheld where plan was temporary, substantially related to its objectives, and did not require the hiring of unqualified persons); Dennison
v. City of Los Angeles, 658 F.2d 694, 696 (9th Cir. 1981) (suit attacking consent decree
affirmative action program barred as collateral attack on decree); United States v. Buffalo,
633 F.2d 643, 648 (2d Cir. 1980) (after proper selection procedures established, hiring re-
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Preceded in several states by fair employment practice legislation,34 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 3" was intended to
rid the nation of employment discrimination.3 6 In 1972, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act3 7 expanded both the reach of Title
VII, to include public employers, and the remedies available under
it. 38 During the enactment of Title VII, competing societal and
political interests forced compromise upon the proponents of a
complete elimination of employment discrimination.39
One such compromise, section 703(h), 4° was enacted in response
to charges that Title VII would gut the practice of seniority. This
section specifically protects "bona fide seniority systems." Despite
the many comments and a lengthy interpretative memorandum,4 1
the term "bona fide seniority system" remains vague and undefined
even today. 42
quired to eliminate effects of past discrimination); Southern Ill. Builder's Ass'n v. Ogilvie, 471
F.2d 680, 686-87 (7th Cir. 1972) (ratio plan upheld on short duration, retained jurisdiction,
liberal interpretation and flexible application); Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442
F.2d 159, 176-77 (3d Cir. 1971) (plan designed to remedy past discrimination in construction
field held valid).
34. For a broad survey of the various state fair employment practice laws predating
Title VII, see Purdy, Title VII: Relationship and Effect on State Action, 7 B.C. INDUS. &
COMM. L. REV. 525 (1965).
35. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-15 (1982).
36. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES
VII AND IX OF THE CIVIL RIGHTs AcT OF 1964, 3119 (1968) (remarks of Sen. Byrd) [hereinafter cited as TITLE VII HISTORY].
37. Pub. L. No. 96-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to 2000e-17
(1982)).
38. Id. The Equal Employment Opportunity Act explicitly expanded the powers and
investigatory authority of the EEOC, changing it from a conciliatory body to an agency with
judicial powers. Equal Employment Opportunity Act, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 to
2000e-14 (1982).
39. The 1964 Act lacks a thorough legislative history. Consequently, courts and commentators frequently refer to memoranda issued by individuals or small groups of congressmen. At least one commentator notes that these should not weigh heavily in subsequent
interpretation. Vaas, Title VI1 Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COMM. L. REV. 431,
457-58 (1965).
40. "Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit
system.
... Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, § 703(h), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1982).
Section 703(h) evolved from a replacement memorandum adopted over a thoroughly criticized predecessor bill. Vaas, supra note 39, at 445-46.
41. TITLE VII HISTORY, supra note 36, at 3039-47.
42. One commentator stated that the determination of whether a seniority system is
bona fide is by a "totality of circumstances" test. Factors used in this determination include
the system's propensity to discourage transfers, the existence of separate bargaining units, a
birth in racial discrimination and present illegal purpose. Kasold, Toward Definition of the
Bona Fide Seniority System, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 41, 48 (1983).
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The Supreme Court, in InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters
v. United States,4 3 stated that bona fide seniority systems are those
which were adopted without discriminatory intent.' Limiting the
opinion to seniority systems adopted prior to the enactment of Title
VII, the Court's ruling permits a seniority system to stand despite a
tendency to perpetuate past discrimination. 45 Recently, the Court
extended protection to all bona fide seniority systems, including
46
those adopted after the passage of Title VII.
B. Seniority vs. Affirmative Action Obligations
Seniority and equal employment rights can conflict in a number
of ways. A highly litigated area of conflict, however, has involved
layoffs of minority workers pursuant to a seniority system.47 In last
hired, first fired layoffs, affirmative action gains can be decimated.
Since minorities are often the last hired, they are inevitably the first
to lose their jobs.
Courts faced with a seniority-affirmative action conflict, first
turn to the agreements to determine whether they provide a scheme
of action for layoffs.4" When such a provision is present, a court's
role is to assure the scheme's constitutionality and to govern its enforcement. Unfortunately, such schemes and explanations are fre-

quently bargained away or simply not considered. 49 When the
agreements lack layoff provisions, the courts are confronted with
43. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
44. Id. at 353-54. The Court did not question that the proven post-Act discrimination
in the seniority system could be remedied by injunction, retroactive seniority and other appropriate relief for those injured by the policy. Id at 347-48.
45. Id. Without a showing of discriminatory purpose behind a seniority system, no
challenge to the pre-Act conduct can be maintained. Id. at 352-53.
46. American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 77 (1982) (limiting section 703(h)
to systems enacted before Title VII is contrary to the plain language of the statute, inconsistent with case law and against labor policy).
47. Presumably, the right to keep one's job is more dear than the right to raises or
promotions, thus layoff situations would naturally create more litigation. See Aaron, supra
note 4, at 1542.
48. See Youngblood v. Dalzell, 568 F.2d 506, 508 (6th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (when
negotiated consent decree contained a boilerplate denial of discrimination, injunction of layoffs that would vitiate affirmative action gains was properly denied); Britton v. South Bend
Community School Corp., 593 F. Supp. 1223, 1232 (N.D. Ind. 1984) (upholding proportional
layoffs established pursuant to a union elected collective bargaining agreement); see also Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 546 F. Supp. 1195 (E.D. Mich. 1982), afi'd, 746 F.2d 1152 (6th
Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 2015 (1985). But see infra notes 203-08 and accompanying text.
49. Both boilerplate denials and outright admissions of discrimination are quite rare in
consent decrees, especially in civil rights cases, because of the ambiguous nature of the decrees. See infra notes 163-65 and accompanying text.
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the difficult task of balancing important social interests. One court
allowed proportional layoffs to prevent the loss of affirmative action
gains.50 Proportional layoffs, however, may do no better than antagonize both whites and minorities.51
The "rightful place" theory,52 which was purported to represent
an equitable middle ground for both sides, first found acceptance in
the Fifth Circuit.5 3 The theory, created mainly for promotion conflicts, suggested that for the fastest and fairest implementation of
Title VII, minorities with seniority should be given the first option
on newly opened positions and promotions. 4 Yet, at no time could
a minority replace a white with actual seniority. 5
The Supreme Court, in Franks v. Bowman TransportationCo.,56
adopted the rationale underlying the rightful place theory. The
Court held that although actual victims of discrimination could receive remedial seniority, incumbent white workers could not be deprived of the seniority which they had earned. 7 In the final
analysis, both blacks and whites would be in their rightful places.
But this method of dealing with seniority-affirmative action conflicts is limited in the layoff context. 8 It simply does not address
50. Tangren v. Wackenhut Services, 480 F. Supp. 539, 549-50 (D. Nev. 1979), aff'd 658
F.2d 705, 706 (9th Cir. 1981). The district court ruled that seniority cannot vest as a property right, since it is merely an economic expectation. The court of appeals, in affirming,
noted that neither Title VII nor case law required that seniority be immunized from all affirmative action.
51. See infra notes 250-53 and accompanying text.
52. See Note, Title VII, Seniority Discrimination,and the Incumbent Negro, 80 HARV.
L. REV. 1260, 1268 (1967).
53. See, eg., James v. Stockham Valves & Fittings Co., 559 F.2d 310, 358 (5th Cir.
1977) (front pay relief calculated to terminate on date worker attains opportunity to move to
his rightful place); Sagers v. Yellow Freight System, 529 F.2d 721, 731-34 (5th Cir. 1976)
(qualification-date formula for calculating rightful place seniority); Mims v. Wilson, 514 F.2d
106, 106 (5th Cir. 1975) (workers must be restored to the economic position in which they
would have been but for the discrimination); Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494
F.2d 211, 252-53 (5th Cir. 1974) (absent special circumstances, back pay should be awarded
to restore injured workers to their rightful place); United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474
F.2d 906, 927 (5th Cir. 1973) (rightful place theory applied to present effects of past discrimination); Local 189, United Papermakers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980, 988-99 (5th Cir.
1969) (rightful place theory first adopted by Fifth Circuit).
54. Note, supra note 52, at 1268-69.
55. Id.
56. 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
57. Id. at 778. In its next term, the Court upheld a seniority system as bona fide but
awarded remedial seniority to identified victims. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324, 347-48 (1977).
58. At least one court did seem to have applied the "rightful place" theory to a layoff
situation. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 633 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1980), cert
denied, 103 S. Ct. 3568 (1983).
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the problem of the destruction of affirmative action gains when an
employer chooses to lay off employees.
C. Public Safety Layoff Cases
Prior to Stotts, a series of factually similar cases were tried
before the lower federal judiciary. These cases were prompted by
layoffs in public safety departments, due to municipal fiscal crises.
In deciding these cases, three courts of appeals upheld injunctions
prohibiting the cities from laying off minorities in order to preserve
affirmative action gains.59
In GuardiansAssociation v. Civil Service Commission,"0 black
and Hispanic police officers in New York City obtained an injunction by alleging that last hired, first fired layoffs would have a discriminatory effect on them. Their original hiring was found to be
based on a discriminatory entrance examination, and, but for that
test, the minority applicants would have been hired earlier.61 The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in affirming an award of compensatory seniority, held that section 703(h) would not apply because
the seniority system was based on a discriminatory test and, therefore, could not be bona fide.62 The new seniority was based on the
date that the members conclusively indicated that they would have
been hired, if the discriminatory test had not been used.63 New layoffs were then to be based upon the modified seniority system.
Guardians is unique among the public safety layoff cases, in that
actual discrimination was found, and was subsequently used to
structure the appropriate relief.64
The case of Brown v. Neeb6 ' arose when black and Hispanic
firefighters in Toledo, Ohio, plaintiffs to a consent decree affirmative
59. Id.; Boston Chapter, NAACP v. Beecher, 679 F.2d 965 (1st Cir. 1982), vacated as
moot, 103 S. Ct. 2076 (1983); Brown v. Neeb, 644 F.2d 551 (6th Cir. 1981).
60. 633 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1980), cerL denied, 103 S. Ct. 3568 (1983).
61. Id. at 246. The district court found that the hiring examinations had a disparate
impact on minority applicants. Id. at 240. Since the examinations lacked the requisite job
relatedness, the Commission could not overcome this prima facie proof of discrimination. Id.
at 241-42. Thus, the court of appeals did not feel compelled to follow the apparently adverse
holding of the Supreme Court in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), that disparate
impact alone in a hiring examination did not make prima facie discrimination. See infra
notes 186-87 and accompanying text.
62. Guardians,633 F.2d at 253.
63. Id. at 251.
64. Id. at 268-69. The plaintiffs' causes of action in Title VI and in § 1981 were left
undecided, yet the dicta would seem to indicate that the court would not find a cause of
action without proof of discriminatory intent. Id. at 262-63. The Supreme Court affirmed
the denial of Title VI relief. Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 103 S. Ct. 3221 (1983).
65. 644 F.2d 551 (6th Cir. 1981).
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action program,6 6 secured an injunction to prevent proposed layoffs
from lowering their percentage in department personnel. 67 The layoffs, which were to be last hired, first fired, were pursuant not only.
to a collective bargaining agreement but also to Ohio law. 68 The
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the injunction of the layoffs. 6 9 The court reasoned that the consent decree, read as a con7
tract, 70 reflected the goal of prompt integration of city services. 1
Given the glacial progress towards this goal and the fact that the
layoffs threatened the existing gains, the preliminary injunction was
held to be proper.72 Even though the consent decree made no mention of layoffs, the court did not consider the absence dispositive. It
reasoned that the decree required affirmative action and that the
layoffs, if anything, were negative action.7 3
Citing Brown extensively, the First Circuit, in Boston Chapter,
NAACP v. Beecher,7 4 held that a district court's injunction of the
layoff of minority police and firefighters was an appropriate way to
prevent a "state of precipitous racial imbalance. ' ' 75 Minority gains
made as a result of a consent decree were threatened by the layoffs. 7 6 The court of appeals held that the trial court had the authority to modify the consent decree when time and experience
demonstrated that the decree had failed to reach its intended re66. For a general discussion of the applicability of consent decrees, see infra notes 15365 and accompanying text.
67. Brown, 644 F.2d at 557.
68. "When it becomes necessary in a police or fire department, through lack of work or
funds,. . . to reduce the force in such department, the youngest employee in point of service
shall be first laid off." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 124.37 (Page 1984). In addition, there was
precedent that the injunction was not proper. Youngblood v. Dalzell, 568 F.2d 506, 508 (6th
Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (reliance on consent decree goals alone in face of boilerplate denial of
discrimination will not support an injunction of minority layoffs).
69. Brown, 644 F.2d at 564.
70. Consent decrees have the aspects of both contracts and judgments. See infra notes
158-61 and accompanying text.
71. Brown, 644 F.2d at 558.
72. Id. at 559.
73. Id. at 558. Interestingly, this action was not brought under Title VII but pursuant
to the procedurally more burdensome 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 of the civil rights statutes.
Id. at 564. In response to the plaintiffs' suggestions for less preferential schemes than layoffs
to cut Toledo's budget, the court of appeals declined to correct the budgetary decisions of the
city's elected officials. Id. at 563. But see infra notes 248-60 and accompanying text.
74. 679 F.2d 965 (1st Cir. 1982), vacated as moot, 103 S.Ct. 2076 (1983). Beecher was
actually decided four days after the Sixth Circuit announced its decision in Stotts v. Memphis
Fire Dep't, 679 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1982).
75. Beecher, 679 F.2d at 977.
76. Id. at 972. The court of appeals noted that there was no Supreme Court precedent
concerning a public employment situation. Id. at 976.
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sult. 7 7 Considering the importance of prompt integration,7 8 such a
modification even took preference over the state law requiring seniority based layoffs. 7 9
The trend in the courts of appeals was clearly towards allowing
consent decree modifications, in order to prevent layoffs from reducing minority employment. No longer a case of first impression
in the Sixth Circuit, the question of layoffs in the Memphis Fire
Department came before the courts.
II.
A.

THE MEMPHIS FIREFIGHTERS CASE

Stotts v. Memphis Fire Department8 °

The 1984 Supreme Court decision in Stotts was a culmination of
ten years of legal confrontations between the city of Memphis, Tennessee, and those concerned with minority employment. In 1974,
the United States Justice Department sued Memphis on various
statutory and constitutional grounds,81 alleging discrimination in
the hiring and promotion of minorities in city services.8 2 As with
many equal employment opportunity cases, the suit was settled
before trial.83 Memphis admitted that its past practices may raise
an inference of discrimination, but denied any actual or intentional
discrimination. 4 In this consent decree, Memphis agreed to the
goal of employing approximately the same percentage of qualified
minorities as their percentage in the general workforce of Shelby
County.8 5

A black firefighter, Carl Stotts, filed a class action suit in 1977,
alleging that the city had continued to discriminate in violation of
77. Id. at 972.
78. The court considered important the fact that the public interest demands a racially
balanced police force. Id. at 977. See infra notes 217-27 and accompanying text.
79. "If permanent employees ... are to be separated from such positions because of
lack of work or lack of money or abolition of positions, they shall ... be separated from
employment according to their seniority.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 31, § 39 (West
1979).
80. 679 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom. Firefighters Local 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S.
Ct. 2576 (1984).
81. These included Title VII (42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17), 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the
fourteenth amendment, and the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972 (31 U.S.C.
§§ 1221-1261). Memphis Fire Dep't, 679 F.2d at 546-47.
82. Id. at 547.
83. The city's motivation in entering the 1974 decree was the desire to remedy past discrimination as well as to avoid the delay and expense of future litigation. Id.
84. Id. at 570-71 app.
85. Id. at 571-73 app.

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[V/ol. 36:87

the 1974 consent decree.8 6 Memphis, apparently realizing that the
decree's goals were not being met, settled the suit again before trial.
The 1980 consent decree incorporated an affirmative action plan,
which specifically required that one-half of all future vacancies in
the fire department be filled by qualified minority applicants until
the representative racial balance was achieved.8 7 The decree failed
to anticipate or address the possibility of layoffs. It did provide,
however, that the district court retain jurisdiction to make any orders necessary to effectuate the purposes of the decree. 8 Although
given the opportunity, the firefighters union did not voice any objections to the decree,' 9 nor did it attempt to intervene in the action.9"
In the midst of a fiscal crisis in May of 1981, Memphis announced the first layoffs in the city's history. 91 The proposed layoffs
were to be on a citywide, last hired, first fired basis. 92
Stotts succeeded in obtaining a temporary restraining order,
preventing the layoffs as planned. 93 Following an evidentiary hearing which revealed that nearly 60 percent of the minority firemen
would be affected under the city's plan, the district court preliminarily enjoined the city from laying off blacks below the percentage of
86. Id. at 547. Stotts' class action suit alleged that the department's hiring and promotion practices violated Title VII and §§ 1981 and 1983. In 1979, firefighter Fred Jones filed a
separate action against the city alleging an improper discriminatory denial of his promotion.
At that time, the cases were consolidated. Id. The city's record in hiring and promoting
minorities was considerably below the goals of the 1974 decree. See id at 550 n.5.
87. Id. at 548. The consent decree also required the city to ensure that 20% of the
department's promotions would go to qualified minority applicants. The decree provided
back pay and promotions for class members, including Stotts and Jones. Id.
88. Id.
89. The proposed decree was posted for comments and objections in each Memphis fire
station for 15 days. Id. See Note, Timeliness of a Motion to Intervene: Stotts v. Memphis
Fire Department, 1984 B.Y.U. L. REv. 219, 226-30 (1984).
90. Memphis Fire Dep't, 679 F.2d at 548. Two days after the posting period had expired, eleven nonminority firefighters objected to the decrees and filed a motion to intervene,
which the district court denied. Id. In a separate decision, the court of appeals affirmed the
denial of intervention, finding not only that the district court had given a reasonable amount
of time to object, but that intervention would delay implementation of the 1980 decree and be
deleterious to both the parties and the public. Id. at 581-85. For the adequacy of notice in
similar civil rights cases, see Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 91 F.R.D. 182,
195 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (one month's notice is timely); Air Line Stewards v. American Airlines,
Inc., 455 F.2d 101, 108 (7th Cir. 1972) (three weeks' notice considered timely).
91. Memphis Fire Dep't, 679 F.2d at 549.
92. Memphis based its layoff policy on citywide seniority rather than seniority within
each service or department. Id. Seniority is mentioned in the 1974 decree, but not in the
context of layoffs. Id. at 573 app. Seniority was incorporated in the city's memorandum of
understanding with the union. Id.
93. Id. at 549.
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minority firefighters employed at the time layoffs were announced. 94
As a result, Memphis chose to lay off three white firefighters,95 ostensibly with greater seniority than blacks who were retained.
On appeal from the preliminary injunction, the Sixth Circuit
found that even though the seniority system was bona fide, 96 the
district court did not abuse its discretion in modifying the consent
decree to prevent the layoffs from substantially affecting minority
employment. 97 The court offered three rationales. First, the modification was correct to prevent the city from breaching its consent
decree "contract." 9 8 Second, the modification was a proper response to an unforeseen circumstance which would cause hardship
to one of the parties and frustrate the purpose of the decree. 99 Finally, the court rejected the argument that section 703(h) protected
the seniority system, citing three reasons. First, the high priority of

encouraging settlements in Title VII cases allows a consent decree
to alter existing seniority practices."co Second, it would be incongruous and counterproductive to limit the court's remedial authority by existing seniority systems.1 0 1 Last, the court, acting under its
authority to enter supplemental orders under
the decree, was simply
10 2
doing what the city was empowered to do.
94. Id. at 551.
95. Firefighters Local 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S.Ct. 2576, 2582 n.2 (1984). The actual seniority of the three whites may be questioned since it was alleged that they and the three blacks
who were not laid off were all hired on the same day. Brief for Respondents on Writs of
Certiorari at 21, Stotts, 104 S. Ct. at 2576. See also Spann, Simple Justice, 73 GEO. L.J.,

1041, 1047-55 (1985) (suggesting that because the mootness question could have been supported as simply in the opposite manner, that the Justices' subjective values were involved in
the ostensibly objective opinion).
96. Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dep't, 679 F.2d 541, 565-66 (6th Cir. 1982). See also id. at
551 n.6. Cf supra notes 40-43, for the continuing debate over the meaning of "bona fide
seniority system."
97. The court of appeals also found that the injunction was not impermissible reverse
discrimination. Memphis Fire Dep't, 679 F.2d at 567.
98. Id. at 556-57. The Sixth Circuit held that Memphis could not simultaneously benefit
from the decree by avoiding the affirmative responsibilities imposed by a judicial finding of
discrimination and ignore the decree's obligations. The city countered with the argument
that it was entitled to breach the agreement because of the unanticipated economic crisis.
The court noted, however, that economic hardship is never an excuse for noncompliance with
the terms of a contract. Id. at 561.
99. Id. at 563-64. The court relied heavily upon its earlier reasoning in Brown, supra
notes 65-73 and accompanying text.
100. Memphis Fire Dep't, 679 F.2d at 564-65.

101. Id. at 566.
102. Memphis could have altered a collective bargaining or other seniority agreement to
conform to the consent decree. Id. at 566-67.
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Firefighters Local 1784 v. Stotts

The Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit, holding that the
injunction could be justified neither as an effort to enforce the consent decree nor as a valid modification thereof. 10 3 Writing for the
Court, Justice White first determined that the case was not moot. 14
The Court then looked to the possibility of relief for the white firemen who had lost pay and seniority.105
The Court formulated the "issue at the heart of this case [as]
whether the District Court exceeded its powers in entering an injunction requiring white employees to be laid off, when the otherwise applicable seniority system would have called for the layoff of
10 6
black employees with less seniority."
The injunction was held impermissible as an attempt to specifically enforce the consent decree.10 Reading the consent decree
strictly as a contract, the Court required that relief and remedies be
available from within the four comers of the document.108 Since
modification of the seniority system because of a layoff situation was
not contemplated by the original document, the Court exceeded the
decree's boundaries.109 Moreover, Title VII does protect bona fide
seniority systems, "and it is inappropriate to deny an innocent employee the benefits of his seniority in order to provide a remedy in a
103. 104 S.Ct. 2576 (1984).
104. Stotts, 104 S.Ct. at 2581.
105. Id. Each white laid off was called back within one month and offered his previous
position. The Court first posited that the injunction remained in force and must be honored
with respect to any future layoffs. Id. at 2583. Even if the injunction was limited to the 1981
layoffs, the modification of the consent decree continued to impact upon the parties. The
majority was also concerned with the respondents' apparent inconsistency in urging mootness on the one hand and the continuing validity of the injunction on the other. Id. at 105.
The importance of the back pay and competitive seniority issues can be questioned since none
of the three white workers laid off were parties to the suit. The factual improprieties taken by
the majority in Stotts have been criticized. E.g., Note, "Last Hired, First Fired"-Rights
Without Remedies: Firefighters v. Stotts, 1985 DET. C.L. REV. 213 (1985) "The case is
troubling for several reasons: (1) jurisdiction to review the lower court decision was questionable from the outset; (2) the Court reached the merits of the case although there had been no
trial; (3) the majority misstated and ignored very critical facts contained in the record;
... ""Id. at 239. Casenote, Labor Law-Has the Supreme Court Put Out the Fireon Court
OrderedAffirmative Action? Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 18 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 737, 764-65 (1985) (Court's analysis fraught with error).
106. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. at 2585.
107. Id. at 2585-86.
108. Id. at 2586 (citing United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 681-82 (1971)
("[S]cope of a consent decree must be discerned within its four corners, and not by reference
to what might satisfy the purposes of one of the parties to it.")).
109. Stotts, 104 S.Ct. at 2586.
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pattern or practice suit such as this.""'
Finally, the Court found
that a consent decree is binding only upon those who are parties to
it. Since the union was not a party, an injunction pursuant to the
decree which affected the union was improper. 1 '
The injunction was also held to be an improper modification of
the consent decree since it impermissibly altered a bona fide seniority system." 2 The Court found unpersuasive the three rationales
asserted by the Sixth Circuit in upholding a change in the seniority
system. First, the encouragement of settlements is not applicable

since an enforced injunction is by definition not a settlement, and in
this case there was no settlement regarding seniority.' 1 3 Second, the
Court cited Teamsters for the proposition that the district court did
not have the remedial authority to change the seniority system because there had been neither a finding of actual discrimination, nor
had there been a previous award of competitive seniority." 4 Finally, the Court held that the district court could not temporarily
override the seniority system, as Memphis could have done, because
this was not a case of unilateral voluntary affirmative action by the
city. The consent decree was, in fact, entered over the city's objection." 5 Justice White expressly limited the reach of the opinion by
saying that the Court need not decide whether the city could volun6
tarily undertake such an affirmative action program."
110. Id.
111. Id. But the union neither protested to the consent decree, nor attempted to intervene earlier. It would be deleterious to the policy favoring civil rights settlements if an affected party could emasculate a consent decree by not joining in its inception and objecting
when the decree was to be enforced. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text (discussing the union's nonintervention); see also Spann, supra note 95 at 1056-60 (very nature of
consent decree may require judge to resort to subjective views in balancing competing societal
interests).
112. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. at 2586-90.
113. Id. at 2587-88.
114. Id. at 2588. Although it is true that there was no finding of actual discrimination or
a discriminatory animus, there was no opportunity for such a finding. The adjudication was
cut off at the trial level by settlement through the two consent decrees. There are two substantial issues thus at odds: the interest in expeditious settlement and implementation and
the importance of finding actual discrimination. To resolve this dispute cursorily without
offering the underlying rationales used in the decision can only lead to more protracted negotiation and litigation. Cf infra notes 191-94 and accompanying text. See also Spann, supra
note 95 at 1066-67 (technical absence of finding a pattern or practice of discrimination is not
significant in face of record replete with statistical evidence inferring intentional
discrimination).
115. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. at 2590. This finding by the Court may place the district court in
the anomalous position of being able to modify that in which it took no part, a voluntary
agreement, yet being precluded from further participation in that in which it expressly retained jurisdiction. Cf infra notes 165-66 and accompanying text.
116. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. at 2590. This concession by the majority has important ramifica-
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Engaging in an animated dissent, Justice Blackmun attacked the
majority opinion on all fronts.t 7 Criticizing each aspect of the
Court's mootness rationale, Blackmun concluded, "today's decision
is provided on the theory that it might affect a defense that the city
has not brought, to enforce contractual rights that may not exist."1' 18 Proceeding to the Court's standard of review, Blackmun
repeatedly emphasized that what was in question was a preliminary
injunction, and chided the Court's treatment of it as permanent.' 9
As to Justice White's "issue at the heart of this case," Justice Blackmun found it incorrect in that the district court had not ordered the
layoff of whites but had merely enjoined the city from laying off
tions for the future of voluntary affirmative action. See infra notes 202-09 and accompanying
text.
117. Stotts, 104 S.Ct. at 2595 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun was joined
by Justices Brennan and Marshall.
Justice O'Connor concurred in the opinion, emphasizing several points. Id. at 2590. She
found that when the collateral effects of a dispute continue to affect the relationship of the
parties, the case cannot be moot. Id. at 2591. O'Connor underscored the importance of
finding a discriminatory animus in Title VII actions and emphasized that there could be no
such finding here because the respondents settled before a judicial determination of the issue.
Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment only, on the narrow grounds of abuse of discretion by the district court. Id. at 2594-95. Stevens considered the majority's entire Title VII
discussion as completely advisory. Id.
118. Id. at 2600. Justice Blackmun attacked each of the majority's justifications for not
finding the case moot, opining that the Court misinterpreted the preliminary injunction. Justice Blackmun also considered the suggestion that the injunction would have a res judicata
effect to be ludicrous. Id. at 2597. Blackmun also objected to the observation that the unraised issues of back pay and seniority had somehow kept the case alive, because the affected
whites were not parties to the case. Finally, Blackmun indicated that the Court had rendered
only an advisory opinion as to the effects of Title VII. Id. at 2598.
119. Justice Blackmun charged the Court with treating the preliminary injunction as permanent by reviewing it under more than an abuse of discretion standard. Id. at 2596. This is
a point of great force, since viewing the injunction as permanent fundamentally changes the
Court's view of the dispute by reading a mere probability as a final adjudication. In reviewing
a preliminary injunction, the only issue is the propriety of the interim decision, and the
court's only manner of correcting it is by vacating the injunction. See University of Texas v.
Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 394 (1981). A review based on an abuse of discretion is quite
different from a review on the merits. Id. at 393. A review of abuse of discretion by the
granting of a preliminary injunction considers the same four factors that a district court must
consider in originally granting the injunction: whether the plaintiff will be irreparably
harmed if the injunction does not issue; whether the defendant will be harmed if it does issue;
whether the public interest will be served by the injunction; and whether the plaintiff is likely
to prevail on the merits. Id. at 392.
The Court in Stotts considered the preliminary injunction still to be in force three years
later, perhaps looking only to the second inquiry, whether the city would be harmed. In
applying the other three elements, a preliminary injunction may have been proper. First, a
60% adverse effect on minorities may be an irreparable harm. Second, the public interest is
in integrated employment. See infra notes 213-36 and accompanying text. Finally, the likelihood of the plaintiff's success on the merits depends upon a showing of discrimination, an
inquiry which was cut short by the imposition of both consent decrees. See supra note 114.
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blacks. 2 ° Finally, Blackmun reviewed and found appropriate race" '
conscious remedies in Title VII actions.12
III.

THE COURT'S QUESTIONABLE APPROACH TO STOTTS

The end result arrived at by the Supreme Court in Stotts is defensible. The respondents never proved discrimination in either hiring or in the layoffs.'22 Therefore, the seniority system, being
classified as bona fide, could not be disturbed under section
123
703(h).
The opinion, however, cuts far too broadly, proceeding with an
apparent disregard for the possible consequences of its decision.
The Court achieved the desired result, but the language and tone of
the opinion may damage affirmative action programs, the effective
center of efforts toward equal employment opportunity.' 24 The

opinion has already been criticized for its loose language and lack of
discipline.

125

This section of the Note examines the Court's refusal to utilize a
solution that the Court itself created one year earlier 26 and its near27
sighted consideration of the possibilities of consent decrees.

Next, the Court's opinion is examined in the context of the federal
role in civil rights litigation,128 and this section concludes with an

examination

of the possible

consequences

of the

Court's

judgment. 2 9
120. Stotts, 104 S.Ct. at 2602.
121. Justice Blackmun points out that the Court ignored the vast applications of remedies
held appropriate under § 706(g) of Title VII. Id. at 2605. The possibilities for affirmative,
class-based relief were repeatedly emphasized. Id. at 2606.
122. Without a finding of actual discrimination against individual minority members, a
grant of remedial seniority would be improper. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324, 353 (1977). Further, even though the district court found a disparate
impact, Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dep't, 679 F.2d at 541, 551 (6th Cir. 1982), neither the court
of appeals nor the Supreme Court affirmed that holding.
123. The Sixth Circuit overturned the district court's finding that the seniority system
was not bona fide, Memphis Fire Dep't, 679 F.2d at 551, and the Supreme Court affirmed,
Stotts, 104 S. Ct. at 2587.
124. See generally Wright, Color Blind Theories and Color Conscious Remedies, 47 U.
CHI. L. REV. 213, 216 (1980) (not until race and ethnicity cease to correspond and begin to
conflict with economic and social divisions will racial politics be subordinated).
125. E.g., The Supreme Court, 1983 Term, 98 HARV. L. REv. 87, 268-69 (1984) (Court
unwilling to embrace the results of its far-reaching language); Spann, supra note 96, at 1066;
Note, supra note 105, at 239.
126. See infra notes 134-52 and accompanying text.
127. See infra notes 153-66 and accompanying text.
128. See infra notes 167-82 and accompanying text.
129. See infra notes 183-212 and accompanying text.
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"The Issue at the Heart of this Case"

Justice White found the issue at the heart of Stotts to be whether
the district court could order white employees to be laid off instead
of black employees. 130 This statement may be very misleading and
could have a deleterious effect on improving equal employment opportunity. By framing the issue in this fashion, the Court characterized the city as having an either/or choice; either breach the
consent decree by laying off blacks, or lay off whites and breach its
seniority agreement. 131 Yet, the district court did not order the city
to lay off white employees in lieu of black employees. Memphis
chose to do so on its own.132 The district court simply ordered the
city not to lay off more than a certain percentage of minority workers. 133 It decreed an injunction, not affirmative relief.
The irony of the Court's framing of the issue in the manner
which it did, is that in its previous term, the Court, in a similar
situation, refused to make such an either/or choice. In W.R. Grace
& Co. v. Local 759, 13 the employer, who had a long history of discrimination against blacks and women, 35 agreed in an EEOC conciliation agreement to maintain a specified percentage of minorities
in its workforce.1 36 Amidst a business slump, W.R. Grace and
Company laid off workers according to the terms of the conciliation
agreement. 137 White males with greater seniority, who had been
laid off, filed grievances and received an arbitrator's award.' 38 The
company sued for relief from the award, citing its compliance with
130. Supra note 106 and accompanying text.
131. A logical defendant for the laid off whites is not the respondents, but the city of
Memphis, which breached the memorandum of understanding with the firefighters union. It
was the city's layoff policy, not the preliminary injunction that prevented the laid off workers
from accruing seniority. See Stotts, 104 S.Ct. at 2599 n.3 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See also
Note, supra note 105, at 242 (union and Memphis had best of both worlds by operating as
partners in a suspect joint venture).
132. In fact, several interested parties, including the union, attempted to dissuade the city
from layoffs entirely by reducing the working hours of all department employees. Stotts, 104
S. Ct. at 2602.
133. The court of appeals characterized the injunction as follows: "The court enjoined
the City from applying the layoff policy based on seniority insofar as it would decrease the
percentage of black lieutenants, Drivers, Inspectors and Privates employed at the Memphis
Fire Department." Memphis Fire Dep't, 679 F.2d at 551.
134. 103 S.Ct. 2177 (1983).
135. The EEOC district director determined that the company had discriminated against
blacks and women and that the seniority systems were unlawful because they perpetuated
past discrimination. Id. at 2180.
136. Id. For a brief description of the conciliation procedure, see M. ANDERSON & H.
LEVIN-EPSTEIN, PRIMER OF EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 96-97 (2d ed. 1982).
137. W.R. Grace, 103 S.Ct. at 2181.
138. Id. at 2181-82.
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the conciliation agreement.13 9
A unanimous Supreme Court refused the company relief from
either the burden of its conciliation agreement or its collective bargaining agreement.
[I]t is undeniable that the Company was faced with a dilemma:
it could follow the conciliation agreement as mandated by the
District Court and risk liability under the collective bargaining
agreement, or it could follow the bargaining agreement and risk
. . . Title VII liability. The dilemma, however, was of the Company's own making. The Company committed itself voluntarily
to tow conflicting contractual obligations.14°
The Court reformulated the issue from which of the two sets of
employees should bear the burden of layoffs, to whether the burden
should be borne by the employer or by one of the classes of employees. In bringing the employer into the debate, the Court focused on
the innocence of the employees
who shared no responsibility in the
14 1
original discrimination.
Like W.R. Grace, the City of Memphis entered conflicting contractual obligations: the two consent decrees' 4 2 and the seniority
agreement. 143 By a W.R. Grace analysis, the city's prayer for relief
would go unanswered. The court would not allow an employer to
breach one agreement for the sake of the other.'" The case comparison is strengthened by recognizing that a consent decree, with
the imprimatur of an overviewing court, would seem more binding
than a conciliation agreement, overseen by an EEOC regional director. 45 Additionally in W.R. Grace, Local 759 had an ironclad collective bargaining agreement, 14 6 as compared with one of doubtful
legality in Stotts. 4 7
139. Id. at 2182. The federal district court entered summary judgment for the company.
Id. The Fifth Circuit reversed. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union No. 652, 759 F.2d 1248
(5th Cir. 1981).
140. W.R. Grace, 103 S. Ct. at 2184.
141. See The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, 97 HARV. L. REv. 70, 274 (1983) (by thus
reformulating the issue, the Court began to forge a solution to the seniority-affirmative action
dilemma) [hereinafter cited as 1982 Term]. Cf Gregory, Conflict Between Seniority and Affirmative Action PrinciplesIn LaborArbitration,and ConsequentProblems ofJudicialReview,
57 TEMP. L.Q. 47, 69-70 (1984) (criticizing the Court's cavalier assumption of the preeminence of collective bargaining over the conciliation agreement).
142. See supra notes 81-93 and accompanying text.
143. See supra note 92.
144. See 1982 Term, supra note 141 at 277-78 (suggesting that Stotts would have been the
perfect opportunity to extend W.R. Grace to the public employment setting).
145. See generally M. ANDERSON & H. LEVIN-EPSTEIN, supra note 136, at 96-97.
146. W.R. Grace, 103 S. Ct. at 2180.
147. The union's collective bargaining agreement may have been unenforceable. See Fullenwider v. Firefighters Ass'n Local 1784, 649 S.W.2d 268, 270 (Tenn. 1982) (city firefighters'
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Under the W.R. Grace analysis, the city would have had to find
another way to solve its fiscal crisis. Layoffs are an undoubtedly
expedient method, but would be precluded.14 8 Perhaps the one difference that could account for the Court's refusal to apply W.R.
Grace was that it involved a private employer as opposed to the
public employer in Stotts. i4 9 Since Title VII was extended to include public employers in 1972, this difference is not a convincing
one. 5 ' In light of the Stotts decision, the Court framed the issue by
viewing the district court as having too much power. By comparison, in reviewing 15the consent decree, the district court would seem
to have too little. 1
B.

Consent Decrees; Useful Tools in Civil Rights Litigation

The opinion in Stotts does not sufficiently recognize the importance of consent decrees in ending discrimination in the workplace.
Along with conciliation agreements, consent decrees are among the
most useful tools available to courts and agencies in equal employment opportunity cases. 152 More so than any judge, the parties are
intimately familiar with the facts and problems of the suit and are
thus able to assert and include in the remedy those issues which
they consider to be important.' 53 Such decrees result not only in
union contract may be unenforceable because the union engaged in a strike that would be
illegal under Tennessee common law).
148. The city was caught between conflicting obligations. But the city's choice was not
necessarily to breach one agreement or the other. Since the cause behind the layoffs was the
fiscal crisis, the city could have honored both obligations by finding another way to balance
its budget. Layoffs were simply the most expedient choice, not the only one. See infra notes
248-60 and accompanying text.
149. E.g., Kahn & Moorehead, Stotts: Death Knell of Affirmative Action or Wishful
Thinking By the Reagan Administration?, 8 CORP. L. REV. 251, 265 (1985). The authors cite
a denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court as a rejection of a chance to deal with the public
employer distinction in Bushey v. New York Civil Serv. Comm'n, 105 S. Ct. 803 (1985).
150. See supra note 37.
151. Comparing W.R. Grace with Stotts reveals another anomaly. An arbitrator's finding
is specifically protected from judicial review other than to its propriety. W.R. Grace, 103 S.
Ct. at 2183. Apparently in Stotts, however, the findings of a federal district court are not due
the same deference.
152. "This burgeoning area of the law is a promising development in the ongoing attempt
to resolve the seemingly intractable problems presented by modem bureaucratic society."
Anderson, The Approval and Interpretation of Consent Decrees in Civil Rights Class Action
Litigation, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 579, 583 (1983).
153. Id. Settling civil rights suits not only binds the open wounds but helps to restrain
litigation. Id. The consent decrees in Stotts are typical. The employer is generally unwilling
to admit to a discriminatory purpose, but rather than risking an adjudicated defeat on the
issue, will admit to a pattern of past discrimination. The alleged discrimination victims are
often willing to bargain away the opportunity to prove intent in exchange for a quick settlement. As an illustration, see the 1980 Stotts decree, Memphis Fire Dep't, 679 F.2d at 570-79
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savings of time and money, but may bring about better post-decree
implementation.' 5 4 For an employment discrimination defendant,
consent decrees can operate to defuse potentially expensive and emdecrees may have the effect of
barrassing revelations. 55 Finally, the
56
dockets.1
federal
clearing crowded
The Court revealed its limited impression of the efficacy of consent decrees in its treatment of the 1980 decree in Stotts. The Court
cited a consent decree's contractual aspects to justify limiting its
investigation under the "four comers" rule.' 5 7 Besides being a
dated form of contract interpretation, analyzing the decree in this
manner denied the importance of the judgment aspects of a consent
decree. 158 Quoting an antitrust case as further justification, 159 the
Court failed to mention that a later case modified the strict "four
comers" rule in consent decrees, to include other appropriate interpretative modes.' 60 Additionally, in interpreting consent decrees in
several courts have not felt bound by the terms of
civil rights cases,
6'
the decree.'
Such an expansive interpretation is required by the very nature
162
of the decrees. Rare is the consent decree that escapes ambiguity.
Many important contingencies are overlooked, forgotten or left unapp. Stotts has already been identified as creating a possible increase in litigation. Seaver,
The Stotts Decision: Is It the Death Knell for Seniority Systems? 10 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J.
497, 502-03 (1985). Such a result is contrary to the goals of Title VII. See, eg., Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974) (cooperation and voluntary compliance selected
as preferred means of achieving Title VII goals).
154. Better implementation is likely because the parties would act as a lubricant, rather
than a brake on change. Anderson, supra note 153 at 580.
155. Id at 581.
156. No one denies that there has been an explosion of civil rights litigation. See, eg.,
Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality and the "Class Action
Problem," 92 HARV. L. REV. 664, 670-72 (1979). For instance, more than one half of the
federal class action suits filed deal with civil rights. Id. at 692 n.125.
157. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. at 2586.
158. "A consent decree is a judicial act, and should be treated as such." It is the
equivalent of a judgment and a form of equitable relief. Anderson, supra note 153, at 585.
159. United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 681-82 (1971).
160. United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 238 (1975) (reliance on
certain aids in construction of consent decrees, including circumstances surrounding their
creation, is proper).
161. Anderson cites several examples of courts in civil rights cases stepping beyond the
"four corners" rule. He finds additional interpretive aids to be particulary useful in discerning the purpose of the decree, such as comparing possible interpretations of the same decree
as a contract only with those viewing the decree as a joint contractual and judicial act. Anderson, supra note 153, at 622-28.
162. A consent decree can be particularly prone to ambiguity as the competing interests
vie for interpretation. Ambiguous language is often inserted in anticipation of an impasse in
negotiations. Id. at 615-16.
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considered. Ambiguity can be especially prevalent in those areas
where the law is evolving quickly. 163 To counteract this lack of
foresight, the issuing court often maintains jurisdiction to remedy
the unforeseen. 1" The district court in Stotts did just that in modifying the 1980 decree. With its informed view of the controversy,
the court realized that the decree was vague regarding layoffs, and
therefore made the appropriate modifications. 165 In striking these
changes, the Supreme Court overlooked the fact that, to be effective, consent decrees must often be amended. In striking down the
district court's action so summarily, the Court has cast doubt upon
the continued use of the consent decree in future employment discrimination litigation.
C.

The Chilling Effect on Other Forms of JudicialRelief

The Supreme Court did not stop at consent decrees but went on
to comment upon what the district court could have done pursuant
to Title VII. 166 Injunctive relief has long been within the protected
discretion of trial courts. It is expressly prescribed by Title VII as a
proper remedy in employment discrimination cases. 16 7 Earlier still,
in all manner of civil rights litigation, injunctive relief has been the
norm when schools, 168 corporations, 169 and state17 0 and local governments 17 ' have been charged with and have been found to have
discriminated against minorities. Viewed with this history, and
with the knowledge that the court's action was a preliminary injunction that did not mandate affirmative action, 1 72 it is difficult to
163. Id. at 628.
164. Id. at 615-16.
165. Memphis Fire Dep't, 679 F.2d at 549-51.
166. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. at 2588-90.
167. "If the court finds that the respondent. . . is intentionally engaging in an unlawful
employment practice. . . , the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice .
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, § 706, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(g) (1982).
168. See, e.g., Boiling v. Sharpe, 357 U.S. 497 (1954) (enjoining the public schools of the
District of Columbia from segregating school children on the basis of race).
169. See, e.g., Washington v. Baugh Constr. Co., 313 F. Supp. 598 (W.D. Wash. 1969)
(preliminary injunction proper upon black trainees' prima facie showing of discriminatory
employment practices).
170. See, e.g., Dorsey v. State Athletic Comm'n, 168 F. Supp. 149 (E.D. La. 1958) (enjoining Louisiana from prohibiting the joint participation of blacks and whites in athletic
competition), affd per curiam, 359 U.S. 533 (1959).
171. See, e.g., Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala. 1956) (enjoining the enforcement of a local ordinance requiring racial segregation on city buses), affid per curiam,
352 U.S. 903 (1956).
172. Rejection of this argument would leave the narrow question of abuse of discretion
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accept the view that the district court went beyond its relief
authority.
Although class-based affirmative relief was not ordered by the
district court in Stotts, the effect of its order in conjunction with the
city's action, appeared to the Court to afford similar gains. 173 Even
if the court had ordered affirmative relief, it can be argued, that it
did not go beyond its authority.17 4 Affirmative relief is suggested as
proper by Title VII, 17 5 and classwide affirmative relief has been approved in every circuit.' 7 6
It is contrary to the established pattern of federal intervention to
decrease judicial power and authority in civil rights cases. Since the
turn of the century, federal courts have consistently been the chainupon which the Court chose not to rule. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. at 2600 (Blackmun, J., dissenting);
see also supra note 118.
173. Although Justice White characterized it as the effect of the district court's order, in
no way was the layoff of white workers with greater seniority the direct result of the court's
order. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. at 2585. Instead, it was the city's choice in reacting to the district
court order that brought about the layoffs. See supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
Perhaps it is these differing views of the same problem which cause the public's dichotomous
view of equal employment opportunity. Most would agree that integration is necessary in
American society. See infra notes 237-46 and accompanying text. But the public may also
view a court order as discriminating against whites. See, eg., supra note 20.
174. The Court discussed the propriety of make-whole relief in seniority questions under
Title VII despite the fact that the district court ordered no affirmative relief. Stotts, 104 S. Ct.
at 2588-89.
175. Supra note 14.
176. Justice Blackmun provided a list. See, eg., Boston Chapter, NAACP v. Beecher,
504 F.2d 1017, 1027-28 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975) (approval of district
court plan to integrate fire department providing relief to class of minority job applicants);
Rios v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622, 629 (2d Cir. 1974) (class of
prospective union applicants entitled to union membership); EEOC v. American Tel. & Tel.
Co., 556 F.2d 167, 174-77 (3d Cir. 1977), cerL denied, 438 U.S. 915 (1978) (consent decree
initiated affirmative action relief need not be limited to individuals who proved discrimination, but is available to class of employees); Chisolm v. United States Postal Service, 665 F.2d
482, 499 (4th Cir. 1981) (affirming grant of affirmative relief to class of postal service employees subject to past discrimination); United States v. City of Alexandria, 614 F.2d 1358, 136366 (5th Cir. 1980) (consent decree allowing preferential hiring until class of minorities are
properly represented, affirmed); United States v. I.B.E.W. Local 38, 428 F.2d 144, 149 (6th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 943 (1970) (district court erred in refusing to allow classwide affirmative relief in pattern or practice case); United States v. City of Chicago, 663 F.2d
1354, 1360-61 (7th Cir. 1981) (class-wide affirmative action relief modified but approved in
theory); Firefighters Inst. v. City of St. Louis, 616 F.2d 350, 362-63 (8th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 452 U.S. 938 (1981) (class-wide relief held proper given history of discrimination);
United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544, 553-54 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 984 (1971) (upon showing Title VII violation, court is vested with broad remedial powers to remove vestiges of past discrimination and to assure lack of future barriers to class of
qualified minority workers); United States v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 625 F.2d 918, 944
(10th Cir. 1979) (absent showing that hiring patterns have improved, class-wide affirmative
relief is proper). Stotts, 104 S. Ct. at 2606 n.10.
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pions of individuals' civil rights.1 77 Antimajoritarian by their nature, the federal courts are the forum where an individual or a
discrete minority can be heard.17 8
Stotts may have a chilling effect on federal trial courts' discretion in future discrimination cases.' 7 9 Knowing that their decisions
are to be subjected to such an extensive perusal, many judges are
likely to adopt conservative approaches.1 80 This caution may fur181
ther limit relief for victims of discrimination.
D. The FundamentalMisconception of Stotts
The Court has not yet determined whether discriminatory hiring and firing may be best considered under the same standard in a
Title VII action. The bona fide occupational qualification is a necessary exception to absolute equal employment opportunity.182 Because of it and other reasons, it is extremely difficult for a Title VII
plaintiff to prove a discriminatory animus.183 A hiring or personnel
officer may, with minimal effort, find or rationalize a legitimate reason for an employment decision regarding an individual. Such legitimate reasons mask the inappropriate ones and shield the
employer from liability.1 84 Possibly with this in mind, Congress declined to include a clause in Title VII that would allow any em177. The theoretical genesis of this trend was in Justice Field's dissent to the Supreme
Court's abdication of this role in The Slaughterhouse Cases, 87 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 83 (1873).
Federal courts began to be recognized as the primary protectors of individual liberties in the
growth of the due process and equal protection clauses.
178.

See generally, J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PRO-

CESS (1980).
179. Such a result could have tragic consequences since many see the federal district
courts as the "front line" of civil rights cases. Since the mid-1950's, the federal dockets have
been increasingly filled by cases seeking the vindication of individual rights. See Miller, supra
note 157 at 670-71.
180. In the face of uncertain Supreme Court precedent, federal district courts have, in
many cases, applied conservative tests and thus have indicated that they will not go far in
stretching precedent. Comment, Bona Fide Seniority Systems: Guidelines For the Use of DisparateImpact in the Teamsters Analysis, 31 UCLA L. REV. 886, 906-13 (1984).
181. Id.
182. "[I]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire... on
the basis of. . . religion, sex or national origin,. . . where religion, sex or national origin is a
bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that
particular business.
... Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, § 703(e), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(e) (1982).
183. See Comment, Employment Discrimination-SenioritySystems Under Title VII, 62
N.C. L. REV. 357, 376-80 (1984) (proposing a new test to separate intent to discriminate from
the definition of bona fide seniority systems by giving each party an affirmative duty of proo).
184. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973) (remanding
to the trial court to determine whether respondent was not recalled from layoff because of his
race or because of his particpation in a "stall in").
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ployer to terminate an employee "for cause."' 8 5 Regarding the
same dilemma, the Supreme Court formulated the effects tests of
disparate impact and1 8 disparate
treatment as prima facie evidence of
6
Title VII violations.
Stotts stops short of establishing disparate treatment. Possibly,
a black could construct disparate treatment by showing that he was
last hired, thereby being the first to be laid off, because he is
black."8 7 The Court, however, would require proof of discriminatory intent,18 8 even when the black firefighter did not request affirmative relief.'8 9

Similarly, section 703(h) effectively eliminates disparate impact
by requiring proof of discriminatory animus. 90 Plaintiffs facing a
bona fide seniority system that preserves a discriminatory status quo
are often left with a futile search for evidence of discriminatory purpose. 191 This requirement has greatly limited redress for impact
victims. 92 The effect of Stotts thus makes it worthwhile for a dis-

criminating employer to avoid pretrail resolution, for it is now effectively sheltered from anything less than an adjudicated finding of
discriminatory intent. 193
This dilemma may be the result of the Court's distinction between standards for discrimination in hiring and firing. One commentator avoids this problem as follows:
185. 110 CONG. REc. 2567 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Celler). Such a clause would be
explicitly contradictory to the basic intent of Title VII as compared to the situationally contradictory nature of the bona fide seniority clause. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying
text.
186. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,432 (1970) (Congress directed the thrust of
Title VII to the consequences of employment practices, not just the motivations).
187. The result in Guardians,however, was premised on the finding first that the hiring
test was discriminatory. See supra notes 60-64, 67 and accompanying text. Supra note 67
and accompanying text. In Stotts, the minority firefighters were twice stopped short of proving actual discrimination or attaining any adjudication of the issue because of the imposition
of the two consent decrees. Thus, the necessary "primary cause" was missing. Supra notes
84 and 87 and accompanying text.
188. Stotts, 104 S.Ct. at 2588 (respondents must show actual discrimination before receiving competitive seniority).
189. See supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
190. Supra note 44.
191. Brodin, The Role of Fault and Motive in Defining Discrimination: The Seniority
Question Under Title VI1, 62 N.C. L. REV. 943, 988 (1984).
192. See, ag., Comment, supra note 181.
193. Thus, in the future, the settlement rationale for upholding the decision of the court
of appeals may be unpersuasive, for the Court effectively gutted it. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. at 258687. Yet, realizing that intent is so difficult for a Title VII plaintiff to prove, an employer may
be willing to risk the costs of litigating the intent question. But see supra notes 153-57 and
accompanying text.
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To regard a limitation on the layoff of minority workers as a remedy for discontinued past hiring discrimination makes the layoff
irrelevant, and transforms the case into a postponed hiring discrimination suit. Otherwise, a limitation on minority layoffs
would have to be regarded as a remedy for the imbalance itselfa result which courts have indicated is barred ....
It is not difficult to envision Stotts as a delayed hiring discrimination
case, for the consequences of discrimination in hiring and in layoff
are substantially equal: gross underrepresentation of employed minorities. The two consent decrees indicate, at the very least, that
disparate impact and treatment of minorities were a continuing concern. 195 A hiring system in which sixty percent of blacks were adversely affected, 1 96 as compared with seven percent of the whites,197
would not withstand judicial scrutiny under any circumstances.
Finally, the Court applied a long-term solution to what is purported to be a short-term problem. Affirmative action programs
are, by definition, temporary. 98 Once integrated employment is
achieved the need for such programs is gone. Merit-based promotion and hiring can be reestablished; seniority-based layoffs can be
legitimately revived.' 99 Employers are not "doomed" to affirmative
action for all time, just until they integrate. 2"
194. Note, Last Hired, First FiredLayoffs and Title VII, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1544, 1568
(1975). The author also suggests that the holding of Griggs indicates that courts may look to
the express goal of nondiscrimination without feeling overly constrained by the legislative
history of Title VII. Id. at 1552. Nevertheless, most of the major decisions of the area cite
some part of the legislative history. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
195. Memphis Fire Dep't, 679 F.2d at 570-79 app.
196. Id. at 549.
197. Of course, there is no way to determine how many whites were adversely affected.
Sixty percent of the blacks would have been adversely affected and they made up 11% of
department personnel at the time of the layoffs. Id. at 550, n.5. One may estimate the
number of whites affected by assuming a one-to-one adverse affect because of the one-to-one
hiring ratio of the 1980 consent decree. Id. at 576 app. Given such an assumption, roughly
seven percent of the whites would be so affected.
198. Supra note 2. See also United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979)
(affirmative action is a temporary measure, not intended to maintain a racial balance but to
eliminate a manifest racial imbalance).
199. Strictly speaking, seniority-based layoffs were not eliminated, but simply broken
down along racial lines. Such a classification is constitutionally permissible so long as there is
a compelling state interest necessarily connected to the classification. In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 305-06 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.), the "Brennan Four," including Justice White, would allow such a classification if favorable to
minorities and if there was an important and substantial state interest closely related to the
classification. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 362 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting). One example of a compelling state interest is the operational needs of a public
safety department. See infra notes 221-24 and accompanying text.
200. There is a large body of opinion, however, that is concerned that, once in place,
affirmative action programs will become permanent institutions. See e.g., Van Alstyne, Rites
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For the proponents of affirmative action, the encouraging note
of Stotts is that it did not extend its holding to include voluntary
affirmative action.20 1 The doctrine established in United States
Steelworkers v. Weber remains alive.20 2 The Court does have the
opportunity to clarify the Weber doctrine in its forthcoming decision in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education.2" 3 At issue in this
case is whether the collective bargaining agreement between the
Board and the teachers union can include a voluntary plan that
would allow proportional layoffs. 2" Because it was a voluntary
program the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals explicitly found that
Stotts would not affect its decision.20 5 The Court may, however,
take Wygant as an opportunity to expand Stotts, in light of recent
cases distinguishing it in a variety of equal employment questions. 2 6 On the other hand, Wygant may help to clear the doubts
of Passage: Race, the Supreme Court, and the Constitution, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 810
(1979) (acknowledging problem of self-sustaining affirmative action programs). This opinion
has already gained considerable popular support. E.g., Will, supra note 20, at 96; Murray,
supra note 20, at 18.
201. The Court did not decide whether the city could have achieved the same result
without violating the law by adopting an affirmative action program. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. at
2590.
202. 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1978); see also supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
Although Weber was to be limited to private, voluntary affirmative action, some courts have
utilized it to approve public employment programs. See supra note 32.
203. 746 F.2d 1152 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 2015 (1985).
204. Id. at 1158. The court of appeals quoted the opinion of the federal district judge
quite liberally in finding that a voluntarily adopted layoff plan violated neither Title VII nor
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 1154-57. Dispositive to the
Sixth Circuit was that the program was voluntarily initiated, by a vote of union membership,
and was further subject to collective bargaining safeguards. Id. at 1158.
205. Id. at 1157-58. The court of appeals also distinguished its own authority, Oliver v.
Kalamazoo Bd. of Education, 706 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1983). Wygant, 746 F.2d at 1158-59.
206. See, eg., Kahn & Moorehead, supra note 150, at 250-65 (several examples). See also,
Turner v. Orr, 759 F.2d 817, 824 (1 lth Cir. 1985) (Stotts distinguished because no contention
that bona fide seniority system was affected, no third party rights involved and voluntarily
entered consent decree); EEOC v. Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, 753 F.2d
1172 (2d Cir. 1985), cert.granted,54 U.S.L.W. 3223 (U.S. Oct. 8, 1985) (No. 84-1656) (Stotts
distinguished because no bona fide seniority plan, did not address prospective relief and defendants found to have intentionally discriminated against plaintiffs); Vanguards v. City of
Cleveland, 753 F.2d 479, 485-89 (6th Cir. 1985) (Stotts distinguished because district court
here did not interfere with existing seniority system and city here agreed to adopted plan);
Boston Chapter, NAACP v. Beecher, 749 F.2d 102, 104 (Ist Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S.
Ct. 2154 (1985) (Stotts distinguished on no seniority issue, no back pay controversey, no
dispute on merits and no need to resurrect dead order); Hammon v. Barry, 606 F. Supp.
1082, 1094-95 (D.D.C. 1985) (no bona fide seniority plan); Britton v. South Bend Community
School Corp., 593 F. Supp. 1223, 1230-31 (N.D. Ind. 1984) (involving voluntary affirmative
action); NAACP v. Detroit Police Officers Ass'n, 591 F. Supp. 1194, 1202-03 (E.D. Mich.
1984) (distinguished because of prior judicial determination of past intentional discrimination
and liability under the fourteenth amendment, in contrast to Stotts which involved Title VII);
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about the future of voluntary, public affirmative action after
Stotts.2" 7 Indeed, voluntarily assuming such a program may be the
only effective way to shield it from review.
What is at risk are the many affirmative action programs initiated and overseen by consent decrees and conciliation agreements.20 8 Stotts' attack on the district court's resolution throws all
such programs into question, unless Stotts is narrowed. The decision could be read as being limited to those consent decrees that are
incomplete for some substantial reason, such as a lack of necessary
parties, 20 9 or to those which grant completely inappropriate relief.21 ° If so read, Stotts may come to mean only that the Court will
not tolerate anything less than carefully crafted consent decrees.21 1
In future decisions the Supreme Court should leave intact self-curing decrees by reestablishing the judicial discretion in appellate review of trial court decisions.
Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. Young, 36 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1019, 1024-25 (E.D.
Mich. 1984) (involving voluntary affirmative action); Deveraux v. Geary, 596 F. Supp. 1481,
1486 (D. Mass. 1984) (distinguished because this case involved decree in which contemplated hiring occurred in same manner and for same reasons).
207. Some have commented that Stotts will prove to be the undoing of voluntary affirmative action as well. See Neely, supra note 8, at 1775. It may instead sponsor a cautious
promotion of voluntary programs in the public sector. So long as a politically responsible
body, such as a city council or a state legislature, makes a finding of discrimination, that body
can take affirmative steps to remedy the discrimination. If a politically responsive governmental body adopts a program that is deleterious to the majority, such a program will be
spared heightened judicial scrutiny. Note, The Constitutionalityof Affirmative Action in Public Employment. JudicialDeference to Certain Politically Responsible Bodies, 67 VA. L. REV.
1235, 1245-46 (1981). The Sixth Circuit found even a mayor's task force to be such a politically responsive body. Detroit Police Officers' Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671, 694 (6th Cir.
1979).
208. It has been estimated that 40% of the private sector's employees are covered by the
federal contract requirement of Executive Order 11,246 alone. OFCCP AND FEDERAL CONTRACT COMPLIANCE 7 (D. Copus & L. Rosenzweig eds. 1981).
209. The Court found the absence of the firefighters' union as crucial to its interpretation
of the consent decree. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. at 2586. But see supra note 111.
210. An award of back pay and competitive seniority could be inappropriate without a
showing of actual discrimination. See supra notes 44-45.
211. E.g., The False Alarm of Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 70 CORNELL
L. REV. 991, 1006-09 (1985) (characterizing Stotts' Title VII language as merely dicta). Contrary to the contentions of Assistant Attorney General Reynolds, participation by the Justice
Department in the negotiation of various consent decrees may not be enough to call the
validity of the decrees into question. Several critics have noted that the Justice Department's
attempt to retrospectively apply Stotts to those consent decrees in which it participated may
be a conflict of interests. Neely, supra note 8, at 1773. At least one court has addressed the
Justice Department's about-face, allowing it to realign itself with Title VII defendants, but
precluding it from asserting a position inconsistent with its consent decree obligations. In re
Birmingham Reverse Discrimination Employment Litigation, 37 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1, 8 (N.D. Ala. 1985).
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IV.

THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN INTEGRATED PUBLIC
EMPLOYMENT

A major reason for upholding affirmative action in public employment is the public's substantial interest in integration of the
workplace. In some areas of public employment, the interest
emerges as the need to employ persons who are familiar and can
empathize with the specific concerns of those whom they are serving.2 12 In other areas the interest is in the wise and efficient use of
tax revenues.2 13 Pervasive throughout, is the the interest in protecting the fundamental rights of insular minorities.2 14 Overall, is the
view that life is richer and more rewarding in a fully integrated
society.
In public safety departments, the interest takes on an additional
importance because what is at stake is the health and safety of the
community as a whole. The overwhelming interest in integrated
police departments can be amply shown. The Detroit police
cases,2.'5 linking both crime and public dissatisfaction with the racial makeup of urban police forces, are examples of this substantial
public interest.
A.

Police Departments

There are numerous substantiated examples of how police activity is directly affected by the racial mix of police departments. Racial makeup affects both the public's perception of the police and
the department's own view of its constituent public.2 16 Race has
been linked to the use of violence by police2 17 and to officer discretion.2 18 It has also been shown to be a substantial contributing fac212. See infra notes 217-21 and accompanying text.
213. See infra note 230 and accompanying text.
214. See infra notes 217-36 and accompanying text.
215. Detroit Police Officers' Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671 (6th Cir. 1979); Bratton v.
City of Detroit, 704 F.2d 878 (6th Cir. 1983).
216. See, eg., Smith & Hawkins, Victimization, Types of Citizen-Police Contacts,and Attitudes Toward the Police, 8 L. & Soc'y REV. 135 (1973). Although Smith and Hawkins did
not set out to link race and perceptions of the police, the import of their figures is undeniable;
blacks' perception of the police is far more negative than is the whites'. White & Menke, On
Assessing the Mood of the Public Towards the Police: Some Conceptual Issues, 10 J. OF CRIM.
JUsT. 211, 213-14 (1982). This study was primarily a criticism of past attitudinal studies of
the police-public perception, but it would not deny the effect of race on that perception.
217. Fyfe, Who Shoots? A Look at Officer Race and Police Shooting, 9 J. OF POLICE SCI.
& AD. 367, 381 (1981). Fyfe found that black and Latino officers are more likely to fire a
weapon, but that it could be attributed to racially varying assignments, socialization and
residence.
218. Powell, Race, Rank and Police Discretion, 9 J. OF POLICE SCI. & AD. 383, 386
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tor in many race riots.2 19

Several studies have hypothesized that an integrated police department is crucial for effective crime prevention.2 2 ° Indeed, sev2 21
eral cases suggest that the public interest demands integration.
The modem urban public demands more than highly effective law
enforcement for the improvement of police community relations.2 2 2
Once this threshold of mutual trust has been passed, police efficiency will increase as a greater percentage of crimes will be reported and correspondingly, investigations are pursued with greater
vigor. Many police departments are thus attempting to implement
their own affirmative action programs.22 3
It is undisputed that, as a body, the police have more day-to-day
opportunities to interact with the public than any other government
entity. 224 Such interactions run the gamut of interpersonal communications.22 5 Yet, the fact that police discrimination is more poten(1981). Powell hypothesized that "[w]here there is a more racially balanced police department, there will be a more equal dispensation of discretion on the part of police." Id. at 389
(emphasis in original).
219. Comment, Detroit Police Officers' Association v. Young: The OperationalNeeds
Justification ForAffirmative Action in the Context of Public Employment, 7 BLACK L. J. 200,
201 (1982) (indicating that the hostility between Detroit's black community and the then
predominantly white police force was a substantial contributing factor to that city's 1967 race
riots). Berg, True & Gertz, Police, Riots, and Alienation, 12 J. OF POLICE SCI. & AD. 186
(1984). In a study made after Miami's 1980 riots, these researchers found that black officers
tend to be far less alienated from the community than white officers.
220. E.g., Note, Race as an Employment Qualificationto Meet Police Department Operational Needs, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 413 (1979) (proposing an amendment to Title VII to allow
race-conscious hiring in the public interest).
221. E.g., United States v. City of Chicago, 663 F.2d 1354, 1364 (7th Cir. 1981) (police
force strained by discrimination is ineffective to the extent that discrimination renders it an
alien body, not fairly representative of the community it serves); Castro v. Beecher, 365 F.
Supp. 655, 659-60 (D. Mass. 1973) (consent decree affirmative action more likely to give
people effective, nondiscriminatory police).
222. See, e.g., GREATER CLEVELAND ROUNDTABLE, RACE AND ETHNICITY IN CLEVELAND (1984).

223. See McCoy, Affirmative Action in Police Organizations-ChecklistsFor Supportinga
Compelling State Interest, 20 CRIMINAL L. BULL. 245 (1984). McCoy gives a checklist of
characteristics a department should consider in implementing an affirmative action plan, so
as best to withstand legal challenges.
224. Unfortunately, these encounters are often marred by a lack of communication.
Many civic leaders note the lack of empathy in the rank and file of police officers for the
victims of crime and the elderly. GREATER CLEVELAND ROUNDTABLE, ACHIEVING BETTER POLICE/MEDIA/COMMUNITY RELATIONS IN CLEVELAND 5-6 (1983).

225. Chief Justice Warren once characterized the range of police-community encounters
as follows:
Street encounters between citizens and police officers are incredibly rich in diversity.
They range from wholly friendly exchanges of pleasantries or mutually useful information to hostile confrontations of armed men involving arrests, or injuries, or loss
of life. Moreover, hostile confrontations are not all of a piece. Some of them begin
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tially blatant and violent 226 does not diminish the fact or effect of
discrimination by other government employees.
B.

The Public Employment

Elsewhere in the criminal justice system, the interest in integration is similar to that of the police departments.2 27 The large proportion of blacks arrested 228 indicates a need for representative
public defenders, probation officers and others to help ensure
fairness.
The public interest in integration extends further still. Other

agencies with a high number of societal interactions include welfare
and other public relief and assistance organizations. Of course, the
interest in a racial mix in these agencies does not extend because of
the possibility of violence, or necessarily even for an efficient expenditure of funds, 2 29 but for the requirements of the truly needy. An
empathetic case worker is potentially better able to provide the assistances and advice needed to help assure that the less fortunate of
society are afforded a modicum of human decency and dignity. Additionally, schools play a crucial role in the socialization of all
youth. In multiracial school districts appropriate role models for
minority students are critically important. Such role models both
encourage minority students to higher aspirations and dispel stereotypes about race. 230 Teacher role models can be especially critical
because poor minority students are often deprived of other role
models.23 1
in a friendly enough manner, only to take a different turn upon the injection of some
unexpected element into the conversation. Encounters are initiated by the police
for a wide variety of purposes, some of which are wholly unrelated to a desire to
prosecute for crime.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968) (footnote omitted).
226. Supra notes 217-20 and accompanying text.
227. Supra notes 221-24 and accompanying text.
228. Bordua & Tift, Citizen Interviews, OrganizationalFeedback and Police-Community
Relations Decisions,6 L. & Soc'y REv. 155, 162-63, 167 (1971). Black youths were far more
likely to resent being stopped by the police. Id.
229. Although economic efficiency is a compelling reason for integration, "[the primary
purpose of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. . . is the vindication of human dignity and not mere
economics." Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 291 (1964)
(Goldberg, J. concurring).
230. Oliver v. Kalamazoo Bd. of Educ., 498 F. Supp. 732, 747-48 (W.D. Mich. 1980)
(citing expert witness' testimony); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 746 F.2d 1152, 1156 (6th
Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 2015 (1985) (quoting district court opinion) (minority
teachers are vitally important as role models for minority students who are deprived of other
role models by societal discrimination); Britton v. South Bend Community School Corp., 593
F. Supp. 1223, 1230 n.3 (N.D. Ind. 1984) (citing Wygant).
231. Wygant, 746 F.2d at 1152.
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Fire departments should be fully integrated if for no other reason than efficiency.2 32 The most serious potential result of a segregated fire department would be to avoid interaction with unfamiliar
minorities altogether, by letting their homes burn. 23 3 But fire departments have many opportunities for non-firefighting societal interactions, such as fire safety programs, fire inspections, arson
investigations and paramedical emergency services.23 4 The greater
the opportunity to interact, as indicated by the police example,23 5
the greater the opportunity for abuse of discretion and thus the importance of integration.
C. An Emerging Interest in an IntegratedSociety
Society has begun to recognize that integration is often an end in
and of itself. The Supreme Court found that a suit for an integrated
236 If
neighborhood may be brought by a white as well as by a black.
Title V1II 237 remedies are not limited by race, then Title VII should
not be so limited. When one may sue to integrate an apartment
complex, then one should be able to bring a suit to integrate the
workplace.23 8 Victimization in discrimination is not limited to minorities alone.
Actual victims of employment discrimination can demand affirmative relief.239 The courts have also held that such relief is appropriate in a class action suit in employment 24 ° and elsewhere.2 4'
When the goal of legislation is integration, not merely non-discrimination, it is counterproductive to adopt a policy that only proven
232. See, e.g., MANAGING FIRE SERVICES 322-24 (J. Bryan & R. Picard eds. 1979) (integrating fire departments may ultimately depend on society's goodwill).
233.

See generally RAPKIN, THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF RESIDEN-

TIAL FIRES (1983) (listing consequences).

234. See MANAGING FIRE SERVICES, supra note 233, at 145-266 (documenting the wide
variety of fire department services).
235. Supra notes 217-27 and accompanying text.
236. Traficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972) (white petitioners had
standing to sue for an integregated apartment complex by alleging injury of loss of benefits of
living in an integrated community). But see Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 (1975) (white

petitioners lacked standing for failure to demonstrate specific harm under other sections of
Title VII to sue for an integrated society).

237. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VIII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-31 (1982).
238. As did the plaintiffs suing for an integrated apartment complex, a white worker may
allege a loss of the benefit of interracial associations if an employer denies work to minorities.
Traficante, 409 U.S. at 209-10.

239. Supra note 14.
240. Supra note 177 and accompanying text.
241. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971) (district court

may order affirmative relief when local authorities have not met their obligation to proffer
acceptable remedies in school desegregation).
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victims of discrimination are "deserving" of affirmative relief.242
Such a policy is contrary to the long history of the federal government as the prime protector of minorities' rights, 24 3 a thirty-year
history of judicial intervention 2" and twenty years of explicit legislation.2 45 Yet, the Reagan administration and the Supreme Court
seem determined to reverse the underlying policy goals of their own
cases, legislation and the public sympathy.2 46
D. Alternatives to Seniority-Based Layoffs
Unlike those that the steel and automobile workers have experienced, layoffs of public employees, particularly municipal employees, can be seen as a reaction to an immediately pressing fiscal crisis
rather than a massive economic retrenchment.2 47 Alternatives to
these layoffs appear to be difficult to formulate as the legislatures
have been unable to create equitable solutions, and the courts have
been unwilling to suggest any.2 48 One commentator has divided the
possible alternatives into preferential and non-preferential alternatives.2 49 Preferential alternatives are those remedies that are specifically race or agreement conscious. 25 0 Proportional layoffs are an
242. Neely, supra note 9, at 1773; Assault on Affirmative Action, supra note 20, at 19.
243. Supra notes 178-79 and accompanying text.
244. See, e.g., Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977) (grand jury indictments held
invalid where jury rolls systematically underrepresented persons of defendants' races);
Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969) (city ordinance requiring housing alliances dealing
with race held unconstitutional); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (antimiscegenation
statute violates equal protection); Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399 (1964) (statute requiring
candidate's race to be on ballot violates equal protection).
245. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Titles II to XI, §§ 201-1106, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to
2000h (1982).
246. See generally Nickel, PreferentialPolicies in Hiring and Admission; A Jurisprudential Approach 75 COLuM. L. REV. 534, 537-42 (1975) (defending preferential policies like
affirmative action programs by three general justifications; compensatory justice, the public
belief that recipients ought to be compensated for disadvantages; distributive justice, counterbalancing disadvantages with special opportunities; and utility, promotion of public welfare
by better and more equitable utilization of public resources); Duncan, The Future ofAffirmative Action: A Jurisprudential/LegalCritique, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 503, 552 (1982)
(of Nickel's three rationales, the distributive justice model indicates the greatest amount of
acceptability and should be utilized as foundation for affirmative action programs); Wright,
supra note 124.
247. The steel and automobile industries have recently undergone massive layoffs caused
by a basic economic retrenchment. Unlike these basic industries, it does not seem likely that
our public safety departments will undergo a similar permanent layoff. Neither department
appears likely to downscale operations and automation may eliminate selected positions only.
248. E.g., supra note 79.
249. Note, Alternatives to Seniority-Based Layoffs: Reconciling Teamsters, Weber, and
the Goal of Equal Employment Opportunity, 15 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 523, 537-43 (1982).
250. Race-conscious alternatives involve an overt preference in that they offer the benefit
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example. Although they have received some favorable scrutiny and
application,"' t proportional layoffs seem an unhappy choice, because they run the risk of antagonizing both sides.15 1 Similarly, a
preferential alternative based on a preexisting agreement, such as a
memorandum of understanding, may exacerbate tensions along preexisting seniority, and thus, racial lines.2 3
Non-preferential alternatives seek to resolve conflicts equitably
among the parties.2 54 The W.R. Grace solution of shifting the burden from between the employee groups back to the employer is an
excellent example.2 55 Neither group is held out as more protected
than the other. Some non-preferential alternatives, such as various
seniority modifications,2 5 6 have already been enacted by private industry. 5 7 Other suggestions include work sharing 58 and wage and
work concessions.2 5 9 The success of these suggestions depends
upon a municipality's willingness to forego a "quick fix" layoff, for
a far-reaching and equitable solution.
of job security by virtue of race. Id. at 538. Agreement-conscious alternatives, by comparison, offer an overt preference by the agreement that those who have the most seniority will
have the benefit of job security. Id. at 544-45. See also Aaron, supra note 2, at 1534.
251. See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 546 F. Supp. 1195 (E.D. Mich. 1982),
affid, 746 F.2d 1152 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 205 (1985); Sisco v. J.S. Alberici
Const. Co., 655 F.2d 146 (8th Cir. 1981); Tangren v. Wackenhot Services, Inc., 480 F. Supp.
539 (D. Nev. 1979), affd, 658 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1981).
252. One commentator suggested that proportional layoffs are impermissable even under
the Weber standards since they would fail most of the standards. Note, supra note 250, at
542-43.
253. This assumes that the preexisting agreement either actually discriminates or tends to
discriminate along racial lines. See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
254. Non-preferential alternatives benefit or burden all workers equally; they do not violate Title VII and are compatible with collective bargaining. Note, supra note 250, at 543.
255. Supra notes 134-42 and accompanying text.
256. Seniority modifications include the consolidation of seniority lists at different plants
or stations of the same employer and from department to plantwide seniority systems. Note,
supra note 250, at 545-56. The EEOC is actively requesting information and suggestions for
further alternatives. Layoffs and Equal Employment Opportunity, 45 Fed. Reg. 60,832
(1980).
257. Such modifications would have been useless in Stotts, where Memphis set its layoff
policy on a citywide basis. Stotts, 679 F.2d at 549.
258. Summers & Love, Work Sharing; An Alternative to Layoffs by Seniority: Title VII
Remedies in Recession, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 893 (1976).
259. Note, supra note 250, at 544-45; See also, Burke & Chase, Resolving the Seniority/Minority Layoffs Conflict: An Employer-Targeted Approach, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 81, 95-97 (1978) ("full payroll remedy" that requires employers to continue benefits and
otherwise uncompensated pay to laid-off workers with seniority and keep minority affirmative
action hirees employed).
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V.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court has determined that minority rights to
equal employment opportunity must take a back seat to legitimate
seniority expectations. The end result, on its face, is defensible, but
its possible ramifications are not. The Court may only have indicated that greater care should be taken in formulating consent decrees, but the language of the decision suggests that the Court said
far more. The decision may be defended because there was no adjudicated, final showing of actual discrimination 2 6° and because an
arguably necessary party to the decree was not joined.261 Precedent
suggested, at the very least, that the case deserved a special investigation of all the interests involved that would lead to a precise and
narrow decision. 262
Instead, the Court chose to paint in broad strokes, mischaracterizing the very heart of the case and the relief sought.26 3 The Court's
somber opinion of affirmative action puts that remedy in a dim
light. The Court seemed to ignore years of precedent and legislation upholding minority rights. 2 4 The tone of the opinion was noticed by a conservative President, whose enforcement of its
interpretation of the case may sweep even wider than the Court intended. 265 Given that possibility and the public interest in integration, 26 6 the Court should grasp the next opportunity to confine
Stotts to those aspects that made the decision defensible.
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Stotts, 104 S. Ct. at 2588.
Id. at 2586.
See supra notes 59-79 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 167-82 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 237-47 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 8 and 247 and accompanying texts.
See supra notes 213-47 and accompanying text.
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